Hattin and Alarcos: a comparative analysis of the institutional response of the military orders to major crises in the Latin East and the Iberian Peninsula*

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ABSTRACT: This article compares the responses of the Hospitallers in the Kingdom of Jerusalem to the disastrous outcome of the Battle of Hattin, and of the Order of Calatrava in the Kingdom of Castile to the Battle of Alarcos. Comparing the impact of devastating battles on these two military orders facilitates the analysis of inter-institutional and extra-institutional factors, such as institutional patterns and relations with the monarchy, which affected the ability of the orders to recover from these crises. The article uses a variety of twelfth- and thirteenth-century primary sources pertaining to the military orders, such as charters and legislative sources, and also letters, papal bulls and narrative sources from the Latin East and the Iberian Peninsula.

Key words: Order of St John of Jerusalem; Hospitallers; Calatrava; Battle of Hattin; Battle of Alarcos; Institutional History.


It is a pleasure to acknowledge the generous assistance and invaluable advice received from Ms. Elizabeth Dougherty in preparing this article. I am also most grateful to the reviewers for their careful, constructive and very insightful comments.

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RESUMEN: Este artículo compara las respuestas de los Hospitalarios en el Reino de Jerusalén al desastroso resultado de la batalla de Hattin y de la orden de Calatrava en el Reino de Castilla a la batalla de Alarcos. Comparar el impacto de batallas devastadoras en estas dos órdenes militares facilita el análisis de factores inter-institucionales y extra-institucionales, como los modelos institucionales y las relaciones con la monarquía, que influyeron en la capacidad de las órdenes para recuperarse de estas crisis. El artículo utiliza una variedad de fuentes primarias de los siglos XII y XIII pertenecientes a órdenes militares, como cartas y fuentes legislativas, y también cartas, bulas papales y fuentes narrativas del este latino y la península ibérica.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Orden de San Juan de Jerusalén; Hospitalarios; Calatrava; Batalla de Hattin; Batalla de Alarcos; historia institucional.


From now on, I do not know a pretext which dispenses us from serving God, since He so much sought our benefit that for it He wanted to suffer pain; already He lost first the Holy Sepulcher, and now He suffers that Spain is being lost. As far as that place is concerned we found obstacles, but here we should not fear sea or wind! Oh my, He could not incite us more strongly even if He had died again for us.2

With these words in his crusader song Hueimas no y conosc razo,3 Folquet de Marseille, troubadour and later bishop of Toulouse, made a connection

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2 Riquer, 1983, vol 1: 600 (lines 1-5). Unless stated otherwise all translation in the text are by the author.

3 Hueimas no y conosc razo is a crusader song written by Folquet de Marseilla as a response to the military defeat suffered by King Alfonso VIII of Castille, in the battle of Alarcos, 19 June 1195. The purpose of Folquet de Marseilla, a troubadour, who in 1195 became a Cistercian monk and on 1205 was appointed bishop of Toulouse was to encourage the kings of Castille and Aragón to embark on a new military campaign against the Muslims. Another crusader song “Senhor, per los nostres peccatz”, composed by the troubadour Gavaudan, probably following the disaster of Alarcos, also connected these two catastrophic events which he saw as a Muslim threat to Christendom, he wrote “Lord, the strength of the Saracens grows for our sins: Saladin has taken Jerusalem, which has not been yet recovered. Because the king of Morocco makes it known that he would fight all the Christian kings with their Andalusian and Arab perfidies, armed against the faith of Christ.” See Riquer, 1983, vol. 1: 583-603 and vol. 2: 1049-1050 (lines 1-10).
between two catastrophic events which shook Christianity, the battle of Hattin and the battle of Alarcos.

Towards the end of the twelfth century Christendom suffered two major blows on its eastern and western fronts. On 4 July 1187, the Frankish armies were crushed at Hattin. Only eight years later, in July 1195, the Castilian forces suffered a terrible defeat at the battle of Alarcos. The consequences of these battles were disastrous. The battle of Hattin in 1187 and Saladin’s conquests in the following year brought about an almost complete collapse of the Kingdom of Jerusalem; it caused heavy human and territorial losses, including the loss of Jerusalem, the Kingdom’s capital. The social and economic structures of the Frankish settlement were destroyed, and the inner struggle for succession to the throne, which continued throughout the thirteenth century, was exacerbated. Although the results of Alarcos were not as disastrous as were those of Hattin, the effects were devastating; Castile suffered extensive territorial losses south of the Tagus River. Toledo, however, was safe, and, despite the fact that the Almohads raided the territory north of the Tagus in the following two years, they did not make permanent conquests there. A significant area of the kingdom of Castile thus remained in Christian hands, a fact that would have a direct effect on the political and economic situation of the kingdom. For contemporaries Hattin and Alarcos were connected, as they constituted a major threat to Christendom. In a letter of 29 March 1196 to King Alfonso VIII of Castile and to King Alfonso II of Aragón, exhorting them to reach an agreement with King Sancho VII of Navarra and to put all their efforts and resources into fighting the Muslims, Pope Celestine III wrote: “… in punishment for our sins, the Lord allowed the violence of the pagans to occupy both the Eastern and Western frontiers of the Christians.”

By comparing the impact of these two decisive battles on the military orders, this article seeks to draw attention to political, economic, religious, and social

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6 FITA, 1895 (repr/ Nendeln, 1968): 225-226, n.º 1, 2, “Cum in ultionem nostrorum crimini num nos manus domini gravius visitaverit et tam orientales quam occiduos christianorum limites occupari permiserit violentia paganorum... domini debemus misericordiam implorare, et pace inter filios ecclesie plenius reformata contra inimicos christiani nominis orationibus et armi iuxta cutislibet officium dignitatis accingi...” On the perception of contemporaries to Hattin and the loss of Jerusalem see COLE, 6 (Abingdon, 1993): 9-39. For Pope Celestine III policy to promote a crusade in Spain following Alarcos and the steps taken against King Alfonso IX of León for his alliance with the Almohads, see RUIZ GÓMEZ, 1996: 152-153.
factors that affected the status of the orders, as well as their institutional capability to respond to major crises.

The interest in the study of the military orders in the last decades has been tremendous. Historiographical developments include studies on a wide range of topics dealing with religion and ideology, liturgy, institutional history, economic, political and military history, criticism, gender studies, charitable activities, archaeology, education, relations with the Muslims. Research is being conducted on different orders in different theatres of war, on their local commanderies and priories, and on the orders’ institutional deployment. Yet, a comparison of the orders in different geographical areas has not received much attention. This article is a comparative analysis which focuses on the Hospitallers in the Kingdom of Jerusalem and on the Order of Calatrava in Castile. These two orders are significant as, although they were both religious military orders, they exemplify different types of organizations; the Hospitallers combined in their aims both charitable and military purposes, and had established an international network of houses to support it. It was an independent order of the Church, subjected only to the authority of the Pope. Calatrava’s aims were military from the outset and its network was mainly Castillian, and mostly, as we shall see, inter Peninsular. Following its foundation Calatrava was incorporated into the order of Cîteaux. These differences raise questions regarding regionalism versus universalism, with which historians have dealt in recent years, by looking at the influence regional settings have had on the international orders. The questions asked in this article regarding the effects of these two major crisis on the Hospitallers and the order of Calatrava, and their responses to them, will contribute to our understanding of the operational capability of the military orders, which had similar aims, but different organizational structures and acted within different historical contexts.

Due to the collapse of the Latin Kingdom and the loss of the city of Jerusalem, the Hospitallers lost their headquarters. Following Hattin and subsequent Muslim conquests, the city of Tyre was the only town in the Kingdom of

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7 It is not possible to list all the publications relating to these fields, but a glimpse into the proceedings of at least three recurrent international conferences dedicated to the military orders, at Palmela, Clerkenwell and Torun give an indication of the richness and diversity of these studies, see for example the latest proceedings of these conferences: FERNANDES, 2012. SCHENK and CARR, 2016. CZAJA and SARNOWSKY, 2013.
8 Important comparative analysis has been conducted mainly on orders active in the same geographical space, see, for example, RILEY-SMITH, 2009. AYALA MARTÍNEZ, 2007.
Jerusalem which remained in Christian hands, all other territories were lost. As these losses included most of the Hospitallers urban properties, lands and castles, they lost most of their economic bases and military disposition. They were left with some possessions in the county of Tripoli and the principality of Antioch and with their fortresses in Crac des Chevaliers and Margat. By 1188 the situation of the Hospitallers in particular and the Latin settlers in general was dire, as described in a letter sent in November 1188 by Ermengol (Armengaud) of Aspa, the Hospitaller interim provisor in the East, to Duke Leopold V of Austria. “We believe”, wrote Ermengol, “that the fall of the sad land of Jerusalem is fully known to you… This summer the unspeakable Saladin totally destroyed the city of Tortosa, except for the Templer citadel, burnt down the city of Valenia before moving on to the region of Antioch where he claimed the famous cities of Jabala and Latakia, the strongholds of Saône, Gorda, Cavea and Rochefort and the lands as far as Antioch. Beyond Antioch he sieged and captured Darbsak and Gaston.” Ermengol finished the letter by stressing the imminent peril to castles which were still in Christian hands in the Kingdom of Jerusalem “Know too, that in the land of Jerusalem Kerak and Monréál, as well as fortresses in Arabia situated in Oultrejordain near the Dead Sea, surrendered through a serious lack of food. We also fear for the Templars’ castle of Safad [fell on 6 December 1188, J.B] and our own Belvoir [fell on 5 January 1189, J.B.], as we do not know how long they can endure continual sieges and life-threatening hardships.”

Among the military orders active in the Iberian Peninsula, Calatrava was the most affected by the consequences of the battle of Alarcos and its aftermath. With the shrinking back of the Castilian frontier to the Tagus, the order lost its territorial basis in the area bearing its name, the Campo of Calatrava, losing all its castles there, including the order’s headquarters. In the Almohads offensive of the following years the Order lost additional castles, such as Pinedrabuena, to north east of Calatrava. The thirteenth century Cronica Latina de los reyes de Castilla, mentions the fall of Torre de las Guadalerzas, Malagón, Benavente, Calatrava, Caracuel (and Alarcos- which did not belong to Calatrava). In 1197 the Almohads aimed west, raiding the territory of Talavera and Maqueda, reaching Toledo, but without conquering it. They laid siege to Madrid and turned east, raiding Oreja, Uclés, Huete and Alarcón. The thirteenth

century chronicler and archbishop of Toledo Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada wrote on these traumatic events “The king of the Almohads… presented for the third consecutive year... to besiege again Toledo, Maqueda and Talavera, but could not get any of them; instead, he stormed Santa Olalla and other places that did not have defences; and advancing from there, he took Plasencia, Santa Cruz, Montánchez and Trujillo; and from there he returned to his land with splendour and pride.”

The battle of Alarcos and the Almohads’ campaigns of 1196-97 were a disaster for Calatrava, it lost its headquarters and all its castles and properties in the Campo of Calatrava. As was the case with the Hospitalers, not all of Calatrava’s possessions were lost. Papal bulls of Gregory VIII and Innocent III, confirming the order’s properties in 1187, 1199 and 1214, show that besides its lands in the frontier regions of Castile, the order had some possessions in less exposed areas throughout the Peninsula. Calatrava kept hold of commanderies to the northwest, north east and south of Toledo, and in the city itself. North of the Duero and outside Castile. In the northeast of the capital, an area which was not directly affected by the events of 1195-1197, Calatrava held the important commandery of Zorita, as well as those of Almoguera and Cogolludo and further north, along the shores of the Duero, Atienza and Soria. And yet, the order’s possessions outside Castile were not significant, except for Aragón, where the encomienda mayor of Alcañiz administered the order’s property in this kingdom.

With the loss of Jerusalem and Calatrava, both orders lost their headquarters and had therefore to look for a temporary location for their convents. The surviving Hospitalers gathered in Tyre, where they established a temporary convent. After the re-conquest of Acre, in July 1191, the order’s headquarters were transferred to this city, where it remained until 1291. It seems, however, that in the 1190s and early 1200s, the order’s convent had settled in the castle of Margat, as the order’s headquarters in Acre were being largely extended and improved. The establishment of their headquarters in Acre required a dramatic extension of the possessions which the order had owned in the city since the twelfth century and intensive building work. Archaeological excavations conducted in the last decades have revealed the magnitude of this work.

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16 On Alcañiz, and on the limited presence of Calatrava in León, Navarra and Portugal at the time see AYALA MARTÍNEZ, 2007: 84, 93 n.º 24, 261, 276, 329 and 408; 1994: 283-287. On Calatrava’s relations with Alfonso IX of León see also FOREY, 1992: 102. Ayala Martínez also emphasized the weakness of the commanderies before 1212, in spite of the fact that some had been established before Alarcos, see AYALA MARTÍNEZ, 1995: 64-66; 2002: 76-77. For the presence of the Hospitalers in this area at the time see BARQUERO GOÑI, 1996: 289-313.  
the second quarter of the thirteenth century, large events, such as the assembly of the provincial or general chapters, were convened outside the city, in the order’s great castle of Margat, which by then was also undergoing major expansions and fortifications. The fate of Calatrava’s headquarters was more volatile than that of the Hospitallers, as a result of incessant hostilities but also because of the order’s determination not to abandon the Campo of Calatrava. With the fall of the castle of Calatrava the knights seem to have retreated to Ciruelos, to the south of the Tajo, from where by 1198 they conquered Salvatierra. This castle, deep in the Campo, in the midst of what was by then Muslim territory, would become the order’s headquarters. Contemporaries attributed to Salvatierra an enormous symbolic significance; as a “castle of salvation”, of “redemption” through holy war. The castle was also considered to be of great strategic importance and, although there is little concrete evidence, it seems that the order launched, and planned to launch, attacks into Muslim territory from there before the end of Alfonso VIII’s truce with the Almohads. Salvatierra fell in 1211, forcing the brothers to regroup in Zorita, among Calatrava’s few remaining castles. The defeat in Alarcos and the subsequent Muslim raids in the Campo de Calatrava, may have resulted in heavy losses and consequently recruitment efforts being made by the order. Referring to this unsettled period, the sixteenth century Calatravan historian Francisco de Rades y Andrada wrote:

The master Don Ruy Diaz, with the knights and clerics of this order who escaped Salvatierra (taking with them the relics that they had in their convent), as they no longer had a town nor castle in all the Campo de Calatrava where they gathered, went to the castle of Zorita that was theirs: and there they established their Convent. Then the master gave the habit of his order to many nobles from Toledo and other parts, which by the providence of God asked for it, and yet, it seemed that this order was already so poor and persecuted, that it was nearly at its end, if God with his mercy did not provide that in less than two years all its property was restored.

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23 RADES Y ANDRADA, 1572: 26. There is no evidence to the number of brothers killed in these campaigns, but they must have been high (AYALA MARTÍNEZ, 2003: 415). The memory of the fallen in Alarcos was to become significant in the construction of the order’s communal memory and identity. Following the establishment of the order’s headquarters in
Indeed, following its re-conquest of 1212, the convent was re-established in the castle of Calatrava, to be moved, however, yet again, between 1217 to 1221, to the castle of Dueñas, to be known as Calatrava la Nueva.  

The recurrent relocation of the convent is one manifestation of the turmoil created by the collapse of the Campo of Calatrava, and this weakness undoubtedly contributed to what seems to be a major institutional crisis which the order experienced at that time. Not only the convent’s location changed frequently but also its masters: Nuño Pérez de Quiñones, who lead the order’s forces in Alarcos, was replaced in c.1197 by a former master, Martín Pérez de Siones, who had a leading role in the expansion of Calatrava south to the Tagus in the 1170s and 80s. Martín Pérez de Siones lead the expedition and conquest of Salvatierra and stood at the head of the order for one or two years, until his replacement, according to Joseph O’Callaghan, by a younger but at the same time experienced brother, Martín Martínez, who had been the order’s clavero (drapier) and among the leading brothers of the convent. During his mastership, however, the order seems to have experienced a schism. Martín Martínez was replaced as master of Salvatierra in c.1206 by Rodrigo Díaz, but appears again in the sources in 1209-1210, as master of Alcañiz, in Aragón. The appearance of two masters simultaneously hints at an internal crisis in the order, an assumption which is supported by Rades y Andrada’s claim that the aim of the brothers of Alcañiz, encouraged by Pedro II of Aragón, was “to create house and convent, [which will be, J.B.] the head of the entire order, Calatrava la Nueva their remains (as they would be known “the martyrs of Alarcos”) were transferred and buried there, contributing to the legitimation and sacralization of the new site, see ZAPATA ALARCÓN, 1996: 615-616. For the description of members of the military orders as martyrs after Hattin see NICHOLSON, 2014: 105-112.

O’CALLAGHAN, 1975c: 8-9. AYALA MARTÍNEZ, 1997: 246-252. Half of the castle of Dueñas was donated to Calatrava in 1191, and the other half bought by the order in 1194. These transactions were confirmed by Alfonso VIII in 1201, see O’CALLAGHAN, 1975c: 4-5. The identification of Dueñas; with Calatrava la Nueva is still debatable, especially from an archeological point of view, see SEGOVIA FERNÁNDEZ and ALAÑÓN GONZÁLEZ, 1996: 555-565.


26 Pedro II granted the brothers of Alcañiz in 1209, for the remission of his sins but also for the defence of Christendom and the oppression of the Pagans, the castles of Monroyo, Molinos and Ejulve, to the south of Alcaniz, on the front line with the Muslims, with the specific requirement to populate them and to fight the Muslims: “siquidem praedicium castrum cum sit fortissimum et munitissimus, et vicinium frontariae Saracenorum, si populatum fuerit cum omnibus...Christianis defensioni et presidio in perpetuum...”, see BC: 40-41.
from that village". The problem with Rades y Andrada statement is that he is a none too reliable sixteenth century source, whereas no other source allows us to corroborate his claim. The lack of additional information led scholars to make completely different interpretations as to the sequence and causes of these events and, consequently, different assumptions regarding the order’s institutional strength during these critical years. The simultaneous existence of the two masters, of Salvatierra and Alcañiz, has been interpreted by Joseph O’Callaghan as an intentional step taken by the convent in order to continue their war against the Muslims, in spite of Alfonso’s truce. Carlos Ayala Martínez, on the other hand, believes that this split is an expression to the weakness of Calatrava’s mastership until the mid-thirteenth century, of its powerlessness to face particularistic and autonomous tendencies within the order or the many pressures from the monarchy. There is no doubt that these crises exposed the orders’ leadership to enormous stress and probably internal crisis, defeat and failure led to criticism, which could have resulted, as was the case in Calatrava, in resignation, removal from office, and perhaps even in schism within the order.

In the case of the Hospitallers, their capability to face the crisis resulting from the disaster of Hattin, seems to have been based on their already established international deployment. Hattin and the campaigns of 1187 and 1188, caused the almost complete disappearance of the order’s leadership in the East, including that of the master, Roger de Moulins, who was killed before the battle of Hattin, in a raid against Saladin in the Springs of Cresson on May 1187. In the aftermath of Hattin, the remaining Hospitallers gathered in Tyre under the command of Borrel, the grand commander of the order. To replace the order’s leadership leading European officers were rapidly dispatched to the East. They formed a temporary governing body in Tyre, appointing Ermengol (Armen-gaud) of Aspa, former castellan of Amposta and Prior of St. Gilles, at that time the most important officer in Europe, as an interim provisor (functioned as temporary master). Together with him were some of the order’s most senior officers in the East and in Europe, as attests the charter of confirmation of the rule of the monastery of Sigena, in Aragón, issued in Tyre in October 1188, which was witnessed by Borrel, the grand commander, Lambert, the Order’s marshal, Archam-
baud, grand commander of Italy, Arlabaud, prior of Germany, and Martin, prior of Hungary and Bohemia. As seems to have been the case with Calatrava, the reorganization and reconstruction of the Hospitallers’ power was entrusted to extremely experienced brothers, and, in the Hospitallers’ case, to brothers who had served in the East and in key positions in the order’s international organization. This is the case of Garnier of Nablus, master from 1190-1192, and Geoffrey of Donjon, master from 1193. Garnier had been grand commander of the order before being appointed prior of England and grand prior of France. His successor, Geoffrey of Donjon, was a brother in Syria and may have been grand commander of the order before he became master in 1193. In the interim period from the death of Geoffrey of Donjon to the appointment of the next master, Alfonso of Portugal in 1204, another experienced brother, Peter of Mirmanda, stood at the head of the order. Peter was probably one of the survivors of Hattin and the ensuing Muslim campaigns. In 1193 he was promoted to castellan of Crac des Chevalliers, one of the few castles which was still in Hospitaller hands and a key post in the order’s leadership. Peter held this post for at least six years. In 1202 he became grand commander of the Order. Following the death of the master Geoffrey of Donjon in late 1202, Peter seem to have led the order until the arrival at Acre of the newly appointed master Alfonso of Portugal.

Unlike his predecessor, Alfonso of Portugal had no experience in the order’s affairs in the East, so necessary for the rehabilitation and expansion of the Order’s devastated military power and economy there. The illegitimate son of King Afonso Henriques of Portugal, Alfonso seems to have been the master of the Hospitallers in Hispania, before being appointed to the mastership in Europe. His appointment is explained by Anthony Luttrell as a papal attempt to ensure the order’s leadership’s stability, and yet, if that was the intention, the results were not as expected. Alfonso’s mastership led to an internal crisis and to his deposition, most probably because of his inexperience in the order’s affairs and, perhaps, because of the unorthodox way he was appointed, which seems to have been due to external pressure.

Legislation, with the purpose of consolidating the orders’ internal organization and hierarchies was considered in both orders a suitable answer to face
their institutional instability. The statutes of Margat of 1204-1206 are among the most important regulations legislated by the Hospitallers in the thirteenth century. Although scholars believe that many of the clauses were already existing practices, the timing of their codification is significant. They seem to have been written as a response to the crisis which led to the resignation of Alfonso of Portugal and dealt with almost every aspect of the order’s system of government and international organization. They regulated the master’s election, authority and relationship with the general chapter. They imposed severe limitations on the power of the master and established the chapter as the order’s most important governing body, with responsibilities of elections, regulation and legislation and they dealt with the order’s provincial organization. The huge expenses incurred for the rehabilitation of the order in the East demanded also a tight control over the order’s finances and properties, a topic which is expressed in the statues. Thus for example it demanded from each of the capitular bailiffs, that is, officials appointed by the General Chapter, to give a written account of the state of their offices and establish a procedure by which these officers were closely supervised by the General Chapter. The statutes also prohibited the alienation of the order’s property without the advice of the Chapter. A close supervision was also imposed on the order’s resources. The statutes stipulated that the responsiones sent from overseas should be received by the master or, in his absence, by the grand commander, and, after being displayed before the sick, taken to the Treasury. This clause reinforces the role of the Treasury in supervising the order’s income and expenses and expresses the essential importance of the responsiones, particularly in the years following Hattin. The statutes of 1204-1206 are also extremely important as they mention, for the first time, the order’s military commitments with its charitable duties. This militarization is reflected in aristocratic elements introduced in the legislation which differentiated between two classes of brothers-at-arms; brothers-knights and sergeants. This class distinction is expressed also in the number of horses supplied to them and in the food provided to them in the refectory.


40 CART. HOSP., n.º 1193. BRONSTEIN, 2013b: 136-39. The first acknowledge of brothers-at-arms was in the statutes of Roger des Moulins (1177-1187) although the order’s militarization may have started earlier, in the 1140s during the magistracy of Raymond du Puy. The statutes of 1206 mentioned aristocratic members, namely sons of nobles (filii nobilium)
In spite of the fact that the legislation in the order of Calatrava was a much more complex process, as more factors were involved including, the Cistercian general chapter, the abbas of Morimond, the master of Calatrava and the papacy, not much evidences remained of legislative activity in the XIII century. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that, as in the case of the Hospitallers, some of Calatrava’s most important regulations seem to have been legislated as a response to the institutional and economic crisis caused by Alarcos. The so-called Statutes of Salvatierra, of c.1211, dealt with the rights and obligations of the master and high officers, with economic administration and use of property, and issues concerning the brothers’ daily life and discipline. The Statutes defined the hierarchy and the chain of command within the institution and established the supremacy of the master. It also, however, indicates the central role the monarchy had in the order, thus, for example, demanded that the acceptance or re-acceptance into the order of brothers who broke the peace of the King, required the monarch’s approval. Moreover, probably in response to the order’s mastership crisis, the Statutes stipulated that the master could be deposed only by the abbot of Morimond, or his delegate. The latter probably referred to the abbot of the Castilian abbey of San Pedro de Gumbiel, near Burgos, to whom the abbot of Morimond had transferred his visitation rights in the 1190s. This legislation could also be a response to the desire of some brothers to free Calatrava from the affiliation to Morimond in favour of San Pedro de Gumbiel, and is considered a most significant step which converted the order of Calatrava into an effective instrument in the service of the monarchy. As was the case with the Hospitallers, the crisis in which Salvatierra found itself after the disaster of Alarcos resulted in a tighter control of the order’s economic activities. The statutes pro-

brought up in the order who were to become knights. The statutes of Hugh Revel, of 1262, restricted access to this class according to social status: only sons of knights (nobilibus parentibus) could serve as knights, and only knights could be elected to the position of master. See CART. HOSP., n.º 627, cl. 10, 1193, cl. 12, 3039, cl. 11. On the order’s militarization see also RILEY-SMITH, 2009: 16-19. FOREY, 1994a, vol. IX: 75-89.


LOMAX, 21 (Madrid, 1961): 488, 492 and 494, cls. 32 and 33-35. AYALA MARTÍNEZ, 2016: 255-257. In this article, which is the most recent study to the Statutes, Ayala Martínez has reconsidered his past views regarding the visit to Salvatierra by the abbot of Morimond. He is more inclined to believe that it was the abbot of San Pedro de Gumbiel who visited the castle at the beginning of the thirteenth century, a fact that would have also received royal approval. On the affiliation of Calatrava with the abbey of Morimond see also O’CALLAGHAN, 1975a: 47-50. On the increasing interest of Morimond in Calatrava in the thirteenth century and the tensions this has created see OLIVEIRA, 2015: 110-111.
hibited the alienation of the order’s possessions unless it was to improve their profitability and that was permitted only with the counsel of the Visitor as well as the Chapter. Moreover, the statutes legislated that the master and other brothers who were involved in the order’s economic activities must render account to the Visitor and to the order’s elders (seniores). There is very little information about the nature of the seniores at this time, but they seem to have been active or retired commanders or elderly brothers.44 The fact that this is their first appearance in the order’s legislation could be indicative of a process for which there is no other evidence, but for which the comparison with the events encountered by the Hospitallers after Hattin, could give some indication. It may be possible that, as was the case with the Hospitallers, a temporary governing body was formed in Salvatierra, constructed of experienced brothers. Unlike the Hospitallers, however, is was not made up of senior officers coming from overseas, but of those who may have gathered there after the collapse of the Campo de Calatrava. In their attempt to reorganize the order and its hierarchical chain of command, the Statutes also referred to the control of the order’s houses. Although the order’s territorial administration and the system of commanderies was not yet fully articulated, and the term commandery is not mentioned in the Statutes, they did decree that all officers of Salvatierra and the order’s other houses were required to render account to the Visitor, the master and the commander (comendador mayor, or Grand commander), on their expenditure and income.45

The Statutes of Salvatierra also dealt with issues concerning the brothers’ discipline and daily life. In this respect it is interesting to see the dispensations connected to their diet, which addressed the dire situation the brothers found themselves in. Calatrava’s Forma Vivendi, dictated by the Cistercian general chapter, allowed the consumption of meat, but restricted it to only one dish, once a day, three days a week. In addition, the brothers of Calatrava were required to fast three days a week from the feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross (14 September) until Easter, as well as fasting during Advent and Lent as required in all military orders. The hardships the order endured following the defeat in Alarcos in 1195 and the establishment of new headquarters in Salvatierra, in the midst of what was by then Muslim territory, may have led to certain dispensations. Abstinence from meat on fast days and periods of fast was


left at the discretion of the master. This concession did not apply, however, to brothers living outside Spain who, as decreed by the Cistercian general chapter of 1233, were subjected to the same regulations regarding meat as other Cistercians.\footnote{ORTEGA Y COTES, 1761, 5-6 and 21 (“uno tantum ferculo et unius generis”), 31 and 43 (“Qui autem in Castris Militiae fuerint”). On the Forma vivendi and Calatrava’s dietary restrictions, see also O’CALLAGHAN, 1996: 11-12 and 26-27. FOREY, 1992: 193-194. BRONSTEIN, 2013b: 148.}

The ability of the orders to recover after these major setbacks depended on internal factors, that is, on their institutional strength and organization, as well as on external factors, such as economic and political circumstances. The basic dissimilarity in the orders’ institutional characteristics meant that their process of economic recovery differed. The Hospitallers in the Holy Land could, at least in theory, rely on their houses worldwide for the supply of money and goods. The Order’s houses worldwide were required to send responsiones, an annual payment of one third of the produce of their lands and specified goods, as well as a supply of manpower.\footnote{BRONSTEIN, 2009: 785-786. The ability of the order’s houses to provide responsiones and additional help depended on political and economic circumstances and, in the case of the houses in the Iberian Peninsula, mainly those in Castille, León and Aragón, on their involvement in the Reconquista (BRONSTEIN, 2005: 100-102). This topic has been recently reassessed by Carlos Barquero Goñi, who has shown that the order’s incomes in Castille were mainly employed locally: to support their military, charitable and financial activity in the Kingdom. See BARQUERO GOÑI, 2015: 87-107. See also BARQUERO GOÑI, 2016: 267-285, for the Hospitallers’ military involvement in the Iberian Peninsula.}

In times of crisis, such as the one generated after Hattin, these supplies were expected to be immediate. Indeed, the pressure put by headquarters on the houses overseas after Hattin led to the liquidation of property for the purpose of supplying cash to the East. This money was heavily invested in the reconstruction of the order’s military and economic power in the East.\footnote{BRONSTEIN, 2005: 64-66.}

After 1192, the Hospitallers built their headquarters in Acre, rebuilt their main castles, and rebuilt the order’s economic infrastructure by acquiring urban property and agricultural land. In the kingdom of Jerusalem the Hospitallers focused their efforts on expanding their patrimony in regions which returned to Christian hands, such as in city of Acre and in and around Caesarea.\footnote{CART. HOSP., n° 1346, 1383, 1400 and 1414. Many of these transactions reveal the involvement of the Hospitallers in the expansion of sugar industry in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, see BRONSTEIN, STERN and YEHUDA, forthcoming.} The Hospitallers also expanded their properties and lands in the county of Tripoli, mainly around their great castles of Crac des Chevaliers and Margat, which remained in their hands and did not fall to Saladin.

These acquisitions, which included, for example, the fortress of Tuban, located in the fertile valley of La Boquée, were not only for defensive purposes, but
also to provide foodstuff and supplies to the castles. In the principality of Antioch they seem to have expanded into gastinae, inhabited areas or uncultivated lands that the Hospitallers could have used for pasture or brought into cultivation. Further north, they also expanded their possessions in territories which were less affected or unaffected by the events of 1187-88, such as Cilician Armenia, for which they received great support from the Armenian King. It is important to note, that although the Hospitallers were involved in the twelfth century in colonizing projects in the Latin East, for example in Bethgibelina (Bait Jibrin), where they granted the settlers a preferential settlement charter, this did not seem to have been the case after Hattin, most probably because of the lack of manpower and also the shrinkage of available free land for colonization.

It is indicative of the weakness of the kings of Jerusalem at the time that, apart from some important donations in the city of Acre following its re-conquest, the monarchy had only a small role in the order’s recovery. These donations show the importance attributed to the military orders in general and the Hospitallers in particular in the restoration of the city after its recovery in the course of the Third Crusade. It also attests to the weakness of the monarchy that two contenders for the crown of Jerusalem made attempts to gain the order’s favour and through it, those of other major political figures. In 1192 Guy of Lusignan gave the Hospitallers a stretch of land to the north of their conventual buildings. Guy’s interest was to enlist the Order’s assistance in the rehabilitation of Acre and also to gain their political support for his claim to the throne of Jerusalem. Garnier of Nablus, who had just been elected to master while serving as prior of England, had close relations with King Richard I and had accompanied him to the Holy Land to take part in the Third Crusade. Henry of Champagne, who replaced Guy of Lusignan as the Kingdom’s ruler, seems

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50 CART. HOSP., n.º 1198 and 1232. The Hospitallers made also great efforts to ensure the connection between these different areas of supply in the Latin East and with Europe by expanding their fleet, which also facilitated the order’s involvement in trans-Mediterranean trade see BRONSTEIN, 2018a: 1-39.
to have also been keen to engage the Hospitallers in the restoration of the city, and in the building of his power. To satisfy the Hospitallers’ growing needs on account of the establishment of their headquarters in the city, he granted them a wall and a gate in 1193 and 1194. These donations enlarged the Order’s compound next to the north wall of the city and allowed them to enlarge and improve their buildings.\(^{57}\) The Hospitallers had received some assistance from the monarchy, yet, the order’s recovery after Hattin was mainly its own doing, enabling it to take part in, and profit from, the flourishing economy of the Latin East in the first half of the thirteenth century.\(^{58}\)

Although Calatrava held property outside the Peninsula,\(^{59}\) the order depended for its recovery mainly on its local possessions.\(^{60}\) An analysis of the order’s economic activities in the critical years of 1195-1212 indeed reveals that its efforts focused on expanding and consolidating their remaining possessions in Castile, and consequently increasing their income from there. Otos, in the vicinity of Toledo, is an interesting example of this. The village of Otos was bought by the order in 1206, and it soon became a commandery, showing the order’s interest in this rich pasture area, essential for the order’s economy, which, mainly from mid thirteenth century, was based on animal husbandry.\(^{61}\) Unlike the Hospitallers

\(^{57}\) *CART. HOSP.*, n.º 938 and 972.


\(^{60}\) It is not until the fourteenth century that annual and fixed payments are mentioned in the sources. It has been suggested that in Calatrava the “headquarters-commanderies” relationship was based on a feudal obligation, where commanderies transferred to the central convent different kinds of rents. See AYALA MARTÍNEZ, 1999: 135-139; 2007: 343-344. RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA, 1994: 57-60.

\(^{61}\) RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA, 1994: 107 and 116-117 (together with Otos the order bought property in Moratalaz, Santa María de Madrid, Valnegral). According to Rodriguez-Picavea not many *encomiendas* were established at this area at this time (p. 119). In «Les commanderies des ordres militaires en Castile et León au Moyen Âge. Étapes d’une évolution», Carlos Ayala Martínez identifies three phases in the establishment of *encomiendas* (commanderies) in Castile and Leon: the *formation phase* (c1160-c1225), the *territorial phase* (c1225-beginning XIVc) and the *phase of patrimonializacion* (beginning XIVc-end middle ages). He shows the weakness of the commanders in this first phase, they were solely representatives of the master, and were given organizational tasks. Commanders were not mentioned in royal charters or papal bulls, as in charters of more established orders. See AYALA MARTÍNEZ, 2002: 75-90. It is worth noticing that probably due to the more local nature of Calatrava the hierarchy prior (provincial preceptor)-master did not exist in this order as it did in the Hospitallers and the Templars, a fact which could have affected the status and strength of the commanders. On the economic development of the *Campo de Calatrava* and the importance of animal husbandry see AYALA MARTÍNEZ, 1996a: 93-99. RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA, 2010: 325-346. ALMAGRO VIDAL, 2014: 55-66; 2016: 163-218.
after Hattin, Calatrava granted *Fueros* to several of its villages. This was a well-known practice that ensured the population and exploitation of lands, therefore increasing the order’s income from them. An example is the *Fuero* granted in 1198 to the settlers of the village of San Silvestre, located in the territory of what became, three years later, the commandery of Maqueda. This village, to the northwest of Toledo, was fully granted to the order by King Alfonso VIII in 1201, with all its properties and seigniorial rights, including the *portazgo*, the right to collect tolls from merchandise passing through the town’s gate. As has been shown by Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea, this was a significant grant, as Maqueda was strategically situated on the crossroad connecting Talavera with Madrid and Toledo and from there to Avila, which had the potential of becoming profitable once the frontier became more stable. It is possible that this donation expressed the King’s desire to involve Calatrava in the defense of the western front line with the Muslims in an area which was deeply affected by the Almohad raids of 1196-97. Maqueda, which was granted *ad ferendum Salvaterre subsidium*, also exemplifies the role of the monarchy in the order’s fate. Castilian monarchs regarded the order as a principal tool for the defense and colonization of the reconquered land. Before 1195 their support was significant for the order’s development, after 1195 it became essential for its survival. Apart from Maqueda, Alfonso granted the order a large number of donations, rights and exemptions from tolls and taxes. Some of these donations show the king awareness of the order’s

62 Before 1195 the order, with royal approval, granted *fuero* in Zorita de los Canes, with the purpose of encouraging the population of the eastern lands of castile (in the proximity of Zorita), Alfonso VIII, confirmed the granting of the *fuero* of Uclés by the order of Santiago (the village of Calatrava functioned according to the *fuero* granted by Alfonso VII soon after its conquest), See GONZÁLEZ, 1960, vol. III: 570-576. RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA, 1992: 365. Not in all places was the order capable of granting *fueros*, e.g., was limited to grant it in places which were under the royal *fuero* of Toledo (RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA, 1994: 135-139). For the population of the Hospitaller territorial base around Consuegra see BARQUERO GOÑI, 1996: 309-313.

63 O’CALLAGHAN, 1075b: 9-10. RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA, 1994: 343. With the acquisition of San Silvestre in 1192 the order bought the seigniorial rights of collecting rents, the amount of which could be seen in the text of the confirmation of the *fuero* in 1198: the inhabitants gave the master of Salvatierra “en servicio”, in other words, in recognition of his seigniorial rights the fifth part of the production of the vineyards as well as rents of other agricultural products, mainly grains. Not all these attempts were economically successful. Huerta de Valdecabranos, to the south of Otos, for example, had belonged to the order since 1194. In 1204 the master Martín Martínez gave *fuero* to the settlers (this probably was an encomienda with a commander). In 1210, however, Huerta was given to a second part for development in return of 1300 maravedis and other goods, see RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA, 1994: 113.

distress. For example, a donation of 18 December 1196, in which Alfonso VIII gave the order parcels of land and mills in Ronda, which was once owned by the order of Trujillo. The lands were given out of compassion for the order’s poverty due to the misfortune of Alarcos. The donation stresses that it was given “Taking into account the poverty of your order resulting from the loss of your chief house of Calatrava and of almost all your possessions following the misfortune at Alarcos, where you campaigned with me.” Unlike the Hospitallers, who had to rely mainly on their own resources for the rebuilding of their castles and headquarters in the Latin East, Calatrava, lacking wide-reaching resources, had to rely on the monarch. From its very beginnings Calatrava was linked with the political and military ambitions of the Castilian monarchy who regarded the order as a principal tool for defence and for colonization and for the integration of reconquered land to the Crown. Alfonso VIII expressed his concern regarding the recovery of the order in his will of 1204, where he assigned it an annual payment of 10,000 morabetinos annually, for ten years, for the repair and construction of the castle of Salvatierra. This was the largest bequest granted by the King in his will to a military order, a fact that reflects the importance he attributed to Calatrava. Alfonso included the order in his plans to strengthen Toledo’s defenses on the eve of the offensive against the Almohads in 1211, by granting the order, the previous year, the palace of Galiana, on the western flank of the city. The grant explicitly mentioned the King’s desire to expand the possessions of these religious men, who, “for the name of God, stand with all their might against the Muslim’ hosts contra hostes sarracenorum incursus pro viribus se opponent.”

An interesting, and final, point of comparison between the Hospitallers and Calatrava in their institutional reaction to these two major crises is their

68 For the grant in Ronda see GONZÁLEZ, 1960, vol. III: 164-165, n.º 658 (English translation FOREY, 1992: 129). This donation was preceded by attempts made by Alfonso VIII to establish the Leonese order of San Julián de Pereiro (later the order of Alcántara) in Castile, and to involve it in the defence of Trujillo, on the southwestern frontier of Castile. This attempt of castellanización of the order by Alfonso VIII, have been analyzed by Ayala Martínez, who drew our attention to the fact that it also fitted Calatrava’s ambitions to control all Cistercian friars in the Peninsula. See AYALA MARTÍNEZ, 1998: 350-354. On the fate of Trujillo during the Almohads’ offensive see GUICHARD and BURESI, 1996: 141.

69 It is relevant in this respect to mention the acceptance of the relation of Calatrava with the Castilian monarchy by the papacy, which was careful not to encourage the order to break the truce Alfonso VIII signed with the Almohades. At the same time the papacy was actively involved in the efforts to restore the Hospitaller economic and military forces in the Latin East. Innocent III integrated both orders into his crusading plans. For a thorough analysis on the relation of the papacy with Calatrava see AYALA MARTÍNEZ, 2014: 130-136. For the Hospitallers see BRONSTEIN, 2005: 103-107.


relationship with other military orders functioning in the same areas and facing similar challenges. These could have been another factor to help them in their recovery. Yet, in the case of the Hospitallers, the collapse of a great part of the Latin East, including almost the entire Kingdom of Jerusalem, led to recurrent rivalries with the Templars. The Hospitallers tried to expand and consolidate their patrimony in the little territory that was left, for example in their lordship of Margat and in the county of Tripoli. This led to a long dispute with the Templars, the case of which was presented by delegates of both orders before Pope Innocent III in 1199. Innocent admonished both orders and commanded them to bring this dispute to an end, writing that their dispute over land near Margat and properties in the town of Valenia was hurtful to Christianity and hindered the efforts to fight the enemies of Christ.  

This sort of dispute between the military orders in the Latin East was a common feature in the thirteenth century, resulting on one hand from the constant shrinking of the territory, and on the other from the growing political and economic power of the orders, opposite the weakening of the central authority. The fact that both the Hospitallers and the Templars could rely on their international infrastructure made them perhaps less willing to compromise. The fact that Calatrava was able to rely only on local resources led to a different approach, and made them look for possible solutions to their dire situation. One such solution was the hermandades, pacts of friendship between the order of Calatrava and Santiago, which existed before 1195, but intensified after Alarcos. A treaty signed sometime 1206-1210 between these two orders stipulated the reciprocated hospitality which should be provided to friars. Heavy penalties would be imposed on those who failed to comply with it.  

Lacking the external resources of the Hospitallers, the ability of Calatrava to survive the difficult years of 1195-1212 depended mainly on its understanding and collaboration with other local organizations, including other military orders.  

As we have seen, towards the end of the twelfth century Spain and the Holy Land experienced two major crises, which deeply affected the situation of the military orders. Hattin and Alarcos were tremendous blows for the Hospitallers in the Kingdom of Jerusalem and for Calatrava in the Kingdom of Castile. The battles and the Muslims incursions which followed wiped out, almost entirely, the orders’ military and economic dispositions in these respective kingdoms. Crises such as these, which had vast implications, provide a significant

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72 CART. HOSP., n.º 1050 and 1069. See also RILEY-SMITH, 1967: 460.  
74 In a later agreement, of 1221 a closer collaboration was envisaged, including mutual hospitality but also collaboration in times of war, share of booty and even refer to a mutual leadership in times of crisis. On the Hermandades see O’CALLAGHAN, 1975d: 609-618. AYALA MARTÍNEZ, 2007: 299-300.
opportunity to examine the orders’ behavior. They required an extraordinary institutional deployment and thus exposed the orders’ flaws and weaknesses. Moreover, analyzing the orders’ reactions to these major crises on a comparative level highlights the external factors which affected their ability to recover. This article has identified many differences between the Hospitaller and Calatrava encompassing, for example, regionalism versus universalism, institutional variations, differing affiliations and historical context. An understanding of these differences is vital to an analysis of the orders’ reaction to crises. The fact that the Hospitallers had already before Hattin an established network of houses from which it could have withdrawn supplies and manpower, meant that the order was more able to recover from Hattin without having to rely on the monarchy, the power of which was by then almost nonexistent, or on other political and military entities in the kingdom, including other military orders. Calatrava, on the other hand, lacking an established international infrastructure, was much more dependent on internal factors, such as the monarchy. These factors also meant that the order had to be also more flexible and was open to different forms of collaboration, such as hermandades with other military orders. The orders’ capability to adopt urgent measures, to reorganize and reconstruct their power in the midst of these crises is also, I believe, evidence of the adaptability of these institutions. The nature of these measures reflects the differences between the Hospitallers and Calatrava.

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Recibido: 02/01/2018
Aceptado: 18/02/2019